While West Africa and the Sahel continue to face unprecedented security challenges, it is still “a land of immense opportunities”, according to United Nations (UN). On the battleground for great powers’ influence that Niger and its neighbours in the Sahel region have become, Russia is scoring impressive points.
The Sahel part of Africa includes from west to east parts of northern Senegal, southern Mauritania, central Mali, northern Burkina Faso, the extreme south of Algeria, Niger, the extreme north of Nigeria, the extreme north of Cameroon and Central African Republic, central Chad, central and southern Sudan, the extreme north of South Sudan, Eritrea, and the extreme north of Ethiopia. Since the uprising in Northern Mali in 2012, the security situation has gone from bad to worse as the country has been rocked by continued violence, poor implementation of a peace accord and 2 coup d’etats. Communities face multiple threats, including climate change, violent extremism, political unrest, and COVID-19. This contributes to a worsening humanitarian situation with more people being forced from their homes than ever before, and a worrying impact on vital social services, like schools and health facilities. The military junta, which has repeatedly ignored timetables to transition to a legitimate, civilian authority, has systematically alienated security partners from neighbouring states,Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), France, the European Union, and the United Nations. It has effectively ceded territorial control of Mali’s northern region to the militant Islamist groups, inflaming tensions with the Tuareg groups that had been cooperating with the government to combat the militant Islamists. While Mali teeters under the strain of the escalating security threat, the junta appears focused on consolidating its hold on power. Burkina Faso has been known for its peaceful coexistence of religious groups and over 60 different ethnic groups for decades. More recently, armed groups have been trying to force division between them in an attempt to stoke violence and gain influence. The resulting conflict between communities destabilizes the region and has led to the formation of many local militias which complicate the security landscape. Deadly attacks are a near-daily occurrence in the north and east of Burkina Faso and its human toll is surging at a dramatic rate.
Chad’s central location in the Sahel makes it important for all actors in the region, as it serves as a dam against—or potential bridge among—the fighters, weapons, and illicit networks surrounding it. In East Africa, the Sudanese civil war has created what numerous UN officials have labelled one of the worst humanitarian crises since World War II and increased concerns that Salafi-jihadi militants could gain a foothold and strengthen links between various al Qaeda and Islamic State affiliates operating in East and West Africa. In West Africa, al Qaeda and Islamic State affiliates are strengthening, as the AES military regimes have cut ties with Western security partners and adopted callous military-first approaches, which has further exacerbated the regional insurgencies. A reduced Western footprint in Chad would undermine efforts to contain these threats and limit the growing risk to regional partners and Europe. Russia already has several thousand soldiers in each of the neighbouring countries of Central African Republic (CAR), Libya, and Sudan and another 100 personnel in Niger, making Chad a potential transit zone and logistics hub. Also, violent extremism in the Lake Chad Basin at the intersection of Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria prevailed in the same period with the reemergence of Boko Haram in northern Nigeria.
Analysts noted that Russia is doubling down its focus on the region by tightening its hold over several Sahel states and looking for new partners further afield – a strategy that could pit it against other world powers. They said, the next battleground may well be the coastal west African states. With Mali’s coup widely seen as enabled by Russia, the junta has always had close ties with Moscow. While never openly acknowledged, in December 2021, the junta negotiated to have an estimated 1,000 Russian Wagner paramilitary forces deploy to Mali as part of a $10.9 million/month deal that also provides Wagner access to Malian gold mines. Security has only grown worse since. Worsening instability has led to increasing democratic backsliding as the military governments in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger are struggling to regain control in the wake of dissolving international support. Expert says, Russia uses military and diplomatic incentives to attract and retain partners on the continent. Therefore, Moscow interests in this region can be categorized into two: combating terrorism and enhancing military; and improving diplomatic, economic and trade ties in Sahel States.
Combating terrorism and enhancing military
After cutting ties with former colonial ruler France and halting military cooperation in a shift towards Russia the junta-led Sahel states of Niger, Burkina Faso and Mali, have agreed to establish a joint anti-terrorism force to deal with an Islamist insurgency that has spread across the region. In September 2023, the three countries signed off on a defence alliance known as the Alliance of Sahel States (AES). According to some analysts, Russia is the AES’s de facto security guarantor, as it is the primary security partner for all three members. Russia also established a military presence in each member country after juntas kicked out their former Western partners.
For some time now, Russia has used these initial defence ties to foster cooperation in numerous other fields, including mineral extraction, nuclear energy, and agriculture. Countries across the Sahel, a region stretching from Senegal to the Red Sea, have turned toward Russia for security assistance in recent years in the face of growing regional instability. Meanwhile, in February 2024, General Abdourahamane Tchiani told a news channel in Niamey that none of the three Sahel countries would rejoin the regional bloc. “Just because we are members of the bloc, food and medicine supply was cut off. Power was also cut off and our own funds have been freezed,” Tchiani added. In the past, Russian mercenaries have supported the Burkina Faso and Malian armed forces in their fight against insurgent groups, report said.
However, experts say with western troops leaving the region, armed groups could intensify attacks on targets. Despite counterterrorism interventions in Africa, a 2023 Global Terrorism Index report shows deaths from terrorism in the Sahel increased by an alarming 2,000% over the last 15 years. Unfortunately, Burkina Faso ranked first among countries most impacted by terrorism, Mali was third, Nigeria eighth and Niger was 10th. The reality is visible. Expert argued that Russia has been successfully reinforcing its military presence in countries of the Sahel region since 2021, when the Mali army, led by Colonel Assimi Goïta, seized power from President Bah Ndaw. Furthermore, he said Niger, Chad, Burkina Faso and Mali that have military rulers are suspending military cooperation with France because Paris never succeeded in pushing back jihadist threats even with the one-time presence of 5,500 stationed French troops in the region.
Similarly, experts attribute the expansion of violent extremism in the Sahel to persistently weak governance, characterized by corruption, democratic backsliding, legitimacy deficits, and human rights violations. Many countries in the region share similar internal dynamics of inequality —state power tends to be concentrated in southern, urban regions while rural, northern areas remain underdeveloped and ripe for exploitation by extremist groups. Thus, Sahel countries are consistently ranked high on the Fragile State Index, particularly Chad, Mali, and Nigeria. Frequent transfers of power are also a problem: Chad, Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger experienced a combined twenty-five successful coups d’état between 1960 and 2022. Consecutive military coups in Mali in 2020 and 2021, resulting in Mali’s current interim government under a military junta, launched the region’s most recent so-called coup epidemic, which saw similar occurrences in Burkina Faso, Chad, and Niger.
Improving diplomatic, economic and trade ties
Russia’s current engagement on the continent seeks to break the diplomatic and economic isolation imposed by the West, to reassert its own relevance on the international stage as the champion of the new ‘polycentric world’, and to advance its geo strategic ambitions in mining, energy and military presence in key areas, such as the Red Sea and the Mediterranean. Russia made significant diplomatic efforts to ensure a high turnout at the second Russia Africa summit, held in Saint Petersburg in July 2023, which was well attended but by significantly fewer Heads of State than the first summit, in 2019. However, the 2023 summit failed to address several African leaders’ concerns about the impact of the war in Ukraine on their countries’ economies. As evidenced in votes on recent United Nations (UN) resolutions, the African countries’ positions on the war vary greatly.
Russia’s expanding influence in Africa also plays out through non official channels, such as the use of private military companies (such as the Wagner Group) and information manipulation campaigns. Russia has concluded military cooperation agreements with 43 African countries, and is a major, though declining, arms supplier to Africa. This cooperation is not linked to democratic pledges, and in multiple African countries hit by coups, Russia has continued or strengthened its military cooperation. Beyond arms, Russia’s trade with Africa is relatively insignificant compared with other trade partners. Russia’s presence is stronger in the African mining and energy markets, notably through mining concessions to Wagner associated companies, and it has signed nuclear cooperation agreements with 20 countries, with plans to build nuclear plants in Egypt and Nigeria.
Recently, Sahel States received Russia’s Foreign and Defence Ministers. During the visit, Moscow signed joint security agreements with Chad, Guinea, Congo, Libya and Niger. However, the visits are seen by civil society and analysts as Russia’s attempt to establish its troops in the Sahel region after military leaders seized power, sparking ideological differences over the presence of American and French troops in Mali, Burkina Faso, Guinea, Niger and Chad. Citizens from these Sahel States views these visits in different perspectives. In Chad, a trader sees these visits as an economic advantage to her home country. As one of the leading producers and exporters of wheat, according to her, she expects Russia to transfer technology and know-how to Chad, where civilians have enough land to produce wheat, rice, maize and beef but do not have enough food to eat. Adding that Russia will assist Chad in developing a viable electricity network that can bring electrical power to 90 percent of Chad’s citizens.
Russia: Renewing interests in West Africa and the Sahel
Moscow has aggressively expanded its military cooperation with African nations by using the private security company Wagner and its likely successor, Africa Corps, with Russian mercenaries taking up roles from protecting African leaders to helping states fight extremists. Down the years, Kremlin has been saying the Russian government has no ties to the business of Wagner Group. Then at the same time, the Russian authorities have fiercely defended Wagner Group’s military business in countries facing conflicts that it has the legitimate right to work and pursue its business interests anywhere in the world as long as it did not break Russian law. However, the Wagner Group’s network in central Africa offers a blueprint for a similar regional logistics network. In Cameroon, a handful of Wagner Group operatives have leveraged the Kremlin’s good relations with the country’s longtime dictator to gain access to Cameroonian ports. Wagner uses the ports to import and export goods and equipment related to its primary theatre of operations in the neighbouring Central African Republic. Togo—like Cameroon—is not as reliant on rents as the states where the Kremlin has agreed to deploy mercenaries to gain access to African rents and resources. Togo also does not require the same degree of security assistance as Burkina Faso and Mali, which are at the epicentre of the Sahel’s Salafi-jihadi insurgency. Both countries have deployed Russian mercenaries to combat the insurgency.
Now the French are gone, the Americans are in a limbo, the Russians flex their muscles and the Germans are left to wonder whether they can protect Europe’s southern flank from the threat of chaos in the Sahel by themselves. Analyst say, the presence of France, a former colonial power in Central and West Africa and the Sahel, is largely seen as an exploitative and overbearing political influence. France has always said it is present in Africa to promote democracy, human rights, economic growth and fight increasing insecurity. Russia’s interests on the west African coast look to be in securing military, diplomatic and economic pacts with leaders of these nations in exchange for strategic access to the Atlantic Ocean. This strategy mirrors how the US military base in Djibouti, Camp Lemonnier, provides the US some access and control in the Persian Gulf, Indian Ocean and Suez Canal. Experts have indicated that Africa is already struggling with widespread corruption and hardships enabled by old-fashioned and puppet leaders, violent conflicts, and coups, foreign powers must be prevented from further worsening the situation under the guise of counter-terrorism operations.
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