Could the End of French Military Action in Mali be Basis for Future Stability in Sahel?
Quote from Susa Africa on December 23, 2021, 12:49 pmSince 2012, Mali has been plagued by a conflict that began as a separatist movement in the north of the country, but devolved into a multitude of armed groups jockeying for control in the central and northern regions.Fighting has spread to neighbouring countries, including Burkina Faso and Niger, with the deteriorating security situation in the region unleashing an acute humanitarian crisis.
[display-map id='6353']
The French military is generally good though we have to measure its success in comparison to the British and German forces. Whereas the Brits could focus on the navy and the Germans on the army, the French had the disadvantage or (advantage) of having to decide on the proportions of each.
[caption id="attachment_19855" align="aligncenter" width="300"] French imperialist troops patrolling in the West African state of Mali. Paris invaded the mineral-rich state on January 11, 2013. Photo: Abayomi Azikiwe/ Flickr[/caption]
Then, the fall of Timbuktu, a world heritage site and legendary destination since the middle ages, mark the end of an initial, lightning advance by French and Malian forces into territory overrun by the insurgents. That sentiment represents a strange twist in France’s often troubled history in Africa. France had a vast belt of colonies here that spanned the Sahara, from the Atlantic coast to just short of the Red Sea. After many of its colonies won independence in 1960, many remained bound to France, using a currency pegged to the franc and then the euro, and maintaining close trade, military and diplomatic ties.
France’s role has been fraught with moral peril. It pioneered brutal techniques to put down insurgencies in the Algerian war for independence, carpet-bombing villages suspected of harboring nationalist guerrillas. In the early 1990s France staunchly supported the Hutu-dominated government of Rwanda, despite growing signs that a blood bath was in the making.
It was in Timbuktu on February 2, 2013, that former French President Francois Hollande declared the start of France’s military offensive in Mali. In August 2014, Paris deployed around 5,100 troops across the Sahel region as part of the Barkhane operation helping to support local governments and their poorly-equipped forces fight an ever-growing insurgency that has left thousands dead. At the same time, there was a jubilant welcome for the French soldiers when they arrived in Mali after militants had hijacked a rebellion and threatened to seize control of the whole country.
[caption id="attachment_19851" align="aligncenter" width="300"] President François Hollande of France in Timbuktu, Mali, on Saturday.Credit...Tyler Hicks/The New York Times[/caption]
President of France, Emmanuel Macron announced a major drawdown of French troops in June, however, after a military takeover in Mali in August 2020 that ousted the elected president Ibrahim Boubacar Keita. French deployment in the Sahel is due to fall to about 3,000 troops by next year. The Sahel is a vast area with a population of almost 100 million people across five countries: Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger (which form the G5 Sahel).
France's recent decision to pull troops out of the key hubs in Mali has raised questions about the future as militants expand their operations in the countryside.France's military deployment in the Sahel is due to fall to about 3,000 troops by next year. French forces already left bases in the northern Malian towns of Kidal and Tessalit in November.
[caption id="attachment_19854" align="aligncenter" width="300"] French troops in Mali, Operation Barkhane. Photo: Alex T / Flickr[/caption]
In some ways, making the decision to leave was the easy part. France now faces the same dilemma the US did in Afghanistan: how to remove troops from the country without the swift collapse of the governments they had spent years guarding. The reasons are complex, both military and social, environmental and economic. Yet a significant proportion of local public opinion feels that France, as a high-tech Western military power, should have been able to "sort" the problem and should now get out of the way if it cannot do so. France originally tried to win the war by force, seeking to replicate the 2007 US “surge” strategy in Iraq. Last year, it sent an additional 600 troops to the region, hoping to clear a path that would allow local forces to take control.
Recently, France handed over its Timbuktu base to Malian forces and the mood in the west African country is one of bitterness and anxiety. Several hundred kilometres away in the capital Bamako, the French presence is still strong but Russian flags are also visible on the dashboards of rust-bucket taxis; on sale in roadside stalls and at the occasional pro-Russian demonstration. In a statement, the French military emphasised that the Malian military maintains “a strong garrison in Timbuktu”, in addition to nearly 2,200 United Nations peacekeepers who are permanently deployed there.
[caption id="attachment_19853" align="aligncenter" width="300"] Protesters in Mali's capital, Bamako, waved Russian flags during an anti-France demonstration in May. Photo: AFP[/caption]
There have been no public protests against Russia but public opinion towards the proposed intervention from Wagner is divided. The shadowy military outfit has been linked to conflicts in Ukraine, Africa and the Middle East. It is believed to be close to President Vladimir Putin and has been accused of committing abuses. The Russian government's denial of links to the group is also treated with suspicion.
Mali’s transitional authorities – the result of two coups since August 2020 – appeared to have negotiated for up to 1,000 Russian mercenaries to arrive in Mali to conduct training, close protection, and counterterrorism operations (though there is no independent confirmation of this figure). This extensive presence would reportedly be paid for by concessions to Wagner Group or related companies on several mines, for an estimated minimum of €10m a month, although the actual cost could be much higher.
Moscow’s ability to help Bamako effectively combat such insurgents groups factors into Russia’s quest to gain greater international prestige while advancing its geopolitical and economic interests across Africa. Mali is rich with natural resources including gold, uranium and limestone, which naturally factor into Moscow’s agendas in the country.
[caption id="attachment_19852" align="aligncenter" width="300"] French Foreign Legion soldiers from the Operation Barkhane Counterterrorism Force taking positions as Merlin helicopters land in the Liptako-Gourma zone in northeastern Mali.[/caption]
To Africans, who feel humiliated by having to rely on their former colonial master for security or angry that the French presence has not ended the bloodshed, or both, Macron’s message was that France will not overstay its welcome. If their leaders are unwilling or unable to build legitimate, democratic institutions and restore public services to long-abandoned regions, Paris cannot do it for them.
The transformation of Barkhane reflects unmet French demands that states in the region take on greater security and governance responsibilities for themselves, particularly following Mali’s August 2020 coup and the subsequent coup in May 2021. But such demands shift the blame from the wider failure of the international community to help stop the spread of instability in the Sahel. The security and development practices that external actors – including both French and European states and international organisations more broadly – have followed over the years have often been short term in nature. They have also sometimes undermined efforts at burden-sharing, stabilisation, and any hope of the kinds of deep political reforms needed to help regional states overcome the challenges to their own populations and institutions.
Till today, France forces continue to face fierce resistance in its invasion of the West African state of Mali. The intervention is unpopular, both in the region, where French involvement is resented as a colonial hangover, and at home, where French casualties have extracted a political cost. Emmanuel Macron himself seemed to understand that reality when he said in June that France could not “substitute itself forever for the states of the region.”
Since 2012, Mali has been plagued by a conflict that began as a separatist movement in the north of the country, but devolved into a multitude of armed groups jockeying for control in the central and northern regions.Fighting has spread to neighbouring countries, including Burkina Faso and Niger, with the deteriorating security situation in the region unleashing an acute humanitarian crisis.
[display-map id='6353']
The French military is generally good though we have to measure its success in comparison to the British and German forces. Whereas the Brits could focus on the navy and the Germans on the army, the French had the disadvantage or (advantage) of having to decide on the proportions of each.
[caption id="attachment_19855" align="aligncenter" width="300"] French imperialist troops patrolling in the West African state of Mali. Paris invaded the mineral-rich state on January 11, 2013. Photo: Abayomi Azikiwe/ Flickr[/caption]
Then, the fall of Timbuktu, a world heritage site and legendary destination since the middle ages, mark the end of an initial, lightning advance by French and Malian forces into territory overrun by the insurgents. That sentiment represents a strange twist in France’s often troubled history in Africa. France had a vast belt of colonies here that spanned the Sahara, from the Atlantic coast to just short of the Red Sea. After many of its colonies won independence in 1960, many remained bound to France, using a currency pegged to the franc and then the euro, and maintaining close trade, military and diplomatic ties.
France’s role has been fraught with moral peril. It pioneered brutal techniques to put down insurgencies in the Algerian war for independence, carpet-bombing villages suspected of harboring nationalist guerrillas. In the early 1990s France staunchly supported the Hutu-dominated government of Rwanda, despite growing signs that a blood bath was in the making.
It was in Timbuktu on February 2, 2013, that former French President Francois Hollande declared the start of France’s military offensive in Mali. In August 2014, Paris deployed around 5,100 troops across the Sahel region as part of the Barkhane operation helping to support local governments and their poorly-equipped forces fight an ever-growing insurgency that has left thousands dead. At the same time, there was a jubilant welcome for the French soldiers when they arrived in Mali after militants had hijacked a rebellion and threatened to seize control of the whole country.
[caption id="attachment_19851" align="aligncenter" width="300"] President François Hollande of France in Timbuktu, Mali, on Saturday.Credit...Tyler Hicks/The New York Times[/caption]
President of France, Emmanuel Macron announced a major drawdown of French troops in June, however, after a military takeover in Mali in August 2020 that ousted the elected president Ibrahim Boubacar Keita. French deployment in the Sahel is due to fall to about 3,000 troops by next year. The Sahel is a vast area with a population of almost 100 million people across five countries: Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger (which form the G5 Sahel).
France's recent decision to pull troops out of the key hubs in Mali has raised questions about the future as militants expand their operations in the countryside.France's military deployment in the Sahel is due to fall to about 3,000 troops by next year. French forces already left bases in the northern Malian towns of Kidal and Tessalit in November.
[caption id="attachment_19854" align="aligncenter" width="300"] French troops in Mali, Operation Barkhane. Photo: Alex T / Flickr[/caption]
In some ways, making the decision to leave was the easy part. France now faces the same dilemma the US did in Afghanistan: how to remove troops from the country without the swift collapse of the governments they had spent years guarding. The reasons are complex, both military and social, environmental and economic. Yet a significant proportion of local public opinion feels that France, as a high-tech Western military power, should have been able to "sort" the problem and should now get out of the way if it cannot do so. France originally tried to win the war by force, seeking to replicate the 2007 US “surge” strategy in Iraq. Last year, it sent an additional 600 troops to the region, hoping to clear a path that would allow local forces to take control.
Recently, France handed over its Timbuktu base to Malian forces and the mood in the west African country is one of bitterness and anxiety. Several hundred kilometres away in the capital Bamako, the French presence is still strong but Russian flags are also visible on the dashboards of rust-bucket taxis; on sale in roadside stalls and at the occasional pro-Russian demonstration. In a statement, the French military emphasised that the Malian military maintains “a strong garrison in Timbuktu”, in addition to nearly 2,200 United Nations peacekeepers who are permanently deployed there.
[caption id="attachment_19853" align="aligncenter" width="300"] Protesters in Mali's capital, Bamako, waved Russian flags during an anti-France demonstration in May. Photo: AFP[/caption]
There have been no public protests against Russia but public opinion towards the proposed intervention from Wagner is divided. The shadowy military outfit has been linked to conflicts in Ukraine, Africa and the Middle East. It is believed to be close to President Vladimir Putin and has been accused of committing abuses. The Russian government's denial of links to the group is also treated with suspicion.
Mali’s transitional authorities – the result of two coups since August 2020 – appeared to have negotiated for up to 1,000 Russian mercenaries to arrive in Mali to conduct training, close protection, and counterterrorism operations (though there is no independent confirmation of this figure). This extensive presence would reportedly be paid for by concessions to Wagner Group or related companies on several mines, for an estimated minimum of €10m a month, although the actual cost could be much higher.
Moscow’s ability to help Bamako effectively combat such insurgents groups factors into Russia’s quest to gain greater international prestige while advancing its geopolitical and economic interests across Africa. Mali is rich with natural resources including gold, uranium and limestone, which naturally factor into Moscow’s agendas in the country.
[caption id="attachment_19852" align="aligncenter" width="300"] French Foreign Legion soldiers from the Operation Barkhane Counterterrorism Force taking positions as Merlin helicopters land in the Liptako-Gourma zone in northeastern Mali.[/caption]
To Africans, who feel humiliated by having to rely on their former colonial master for security or angry that the French presence has not ended the bloodshed, or both, Macron’s message was that France will not overstay its welcome. If their leaders are unwilling or unable to build legitimate, democratic institutions and restore public services to long-abandoned regions, Paris cannot do it for them.
The transformation of Barkhane reflects unmet French demands that states in the region take on greater security and governance responsibilities for themselves, particularly following Mali’s August 2020 coup and the subsequent coup in May 2021. But such demands shift the blame from the wider failure of the international community to help stop the spread of instability in the Sahel. The security and development practices that external actors – including both French and European states and international organisations more broadly – have followed over the years have often been short term in nature. They have also sometimes undermined efforts at burden-sharing, stabilisation, and any hope of the kinds of deep political reforms needed to help regional states overcome the challenges to their own populations and institutions.
Till today, France forces continue to face fierce resistance in its invasion of the West African state of Mali. The intervention is unpopular, both in the region, where French involvement is resented as a colonial hangover, and at home, where French casualties have extracted a political cost. Emmanuel Macron himself seemed to understand that reality when he said in June that France could not “substitute itself forever for the states of the region.”
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